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Abstract
Fritjof Capra's holism and the structures of philosophical conceptualisation: 
The logosemantics of complexity
This article explores a field o f study that I  call logosemantics: the theory o f  
conceptual structures that determine philosophical expressions o f ultimate insight. 
The kind o f structures that logosemantics postulates are described with reference 
to the holistic philosophy o f Capra. In particular the conceptualisation o f holistic 
complexity in relation to reductionistic simplicity is thematised. In the course o f 
this analysis the logosemantic place o f complexity in the conceptual structure o f  
philosophically foundational expressions is identified, with reference not only to 
Capra, but also to various philosophical "languages " in the history o f Western 
thought, from Greek metaphysics to systems philosophy and post-structuralism. 
Attention is also given to some Eastern philosophies. After a purely descriptive 
analysis o f logosemantic form, the possibility o f logosemantic criticism is 
considered. The relation o f simplicity and complexity is reviewed again, and an 
alternative interpretation to the one seemingly favoured by Capra is suggested.
1. Introduction
Out of the European tradition of critical discourse have grown, in our time, 
discourses that critically distance themselves from this very tradition. One such 
discourse is that of post-structuralist (some would say: postmodernist) philosophy
1 A version of this article was read at a workshop of the fifth conference of the International 
Society for the Study of European Ideas, Utrecht, August 1996.
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as a whole. Another is the holistic philosophy elaborated by Fritjof Capra, which 
developed out of the concerns of social movements in the sixties, seventies and 
eighties, and which sought to unite these concerns with a quest for scientific truth. 
This philosophy may in some respects be likened to postmodernism, but it has a 
distinctive profile and a separate identity. This is especially true as regards its 
respect for, and involvement with, scientific research in (primarily) physics and 
biology.
My purpose in this article is to look closely at one particular concept that plays a 
key role in Capra’s holistic philosophy, the concept o f complexity. There are 
three goals that I would like to achieve with this analysis.
•  First, to acquaint the reader with the theory of logosemantics, which is a 
theory (which I have tried to develop) about the structures of philosophical 
conceptualisation.
•  Second, to use different discourses on complexity -  among them that of Capra
-  to illustrate and also to test aspects o f logosemantic theory. (Thus, we will 
be in a position to continually compare the logosemantics of Capra’s concepts 
with various other theories.)
• And third, to raise some critical questions about the way that Capra and others
-  especially systems-theorists -  think about complexity, thus demonstrating 
something of the critical potential of logosemantics (over and above its formal- 
descriptive potential).
2. Logosemantic theory
2.1 The conceptual structures of philosophical discourse
Logosemantics is a theory about philosophical discourse. (Not only the discourse 
belonging to the individual subject, philosophy, but also discourse from other 
disciplines, as far as this contain pronouncements of a philosophical nature.) The 
basic premise of logosemantics is that, just as we may study the syntactic 
structures of everyday language, so we might study the conceptual (logico- 
semantic) structures of philosophical discourse. Let me give a very brief and 
informal overview of the most basic conceptual structures postulated by logo­
semantics.
First o f all there is what may be termed the kemel-proposition sustaining any 
body o f genuine philosophical discourse, a proposition that can usually be re­
constructed from actual expressions featured in the discourse. Such a proposition
Frllpf Capra's holism and the structures o f philosophical conceptualisation ...
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is constituted by three conceptual categories, those of subject, operator and do­
main.2
The subject-category covers that particular function, entity, structure, process, 
etc., that the discourse presents as the explanatory discovery of the author, as the 
important “thing” that in some way structures the whole of reality or large parts 
of reality. Such a logosemantic subject might be the Platonic ideas or the Greek- 
Christian Logos of ancient times; it might be the Kantian reason or the Marxian 
class relations or the Freudian psycho-dynamics of modem times; it might even 
be the Foucauldian power or the Derridean différance or the Rortyan contingency 
of postmodern times.
The domain-category covers those sectors of reality that are in some way 
dependent on the posited subject: for instance, a certain proposition may grant 
historical processes final authority over all of culture and society; another does 
the same for “principles of mind” with regard to language, art and morality; 
another empowers society over science, or nature over culture, etc.
The operator-category indicates the precise action(s) performed by the subject on 
the domain, whether it causes, precedes, grounds, rules, transcends, or comes to 
expression within the latter, or whatever.
Besides the categories inherent in the kerael-proposition, there is another kind of 
category that concerns us in this article. This is the category o f  (primary) 
attributes. The fact is that from the time of Greek philosophy, we see a relatively 
small set of pairs of contrasting concepts that are used, again and again, to 
specify the domain and especially the subject o f logosemantic propositions. These 
are classic concepts in the history of philosophy, like necessity versus contin­
gency, finitude versus infinity, universality versus individuality, constancy versus 
change, and so on. The reconstruction of (part of) an extended logosemantic 
proposition that comprises also the attribute category, might thus look something 
like this (using the linguistic convention of labelled category brackets):3
2 Usually, a philosophical discourse is generated by a set of logosemantic propositions, relating to 
each other in specific ways. But to keep the exposition as simple as possible, I will assume for 
the moment that only one such proposition is at stake, containing the most characteristic 
concepts of the discourse in question (But this assumption soon changes, when we get to 
dualistic conceptions.)
3 Logosemantic propositions select from what we may think of as a lexicon of formal ontological 
concepts. In deriving a proposition from the actual expressions of a discourse, the latter must be 
reduced to these formal concepts. As regards the notational form of the example-proposition 
presented here, I have simplified it for ease of presentation (leaving out, for example, the outer 
brackets that should indicate the category of “proposition”). In a more formal presentation I
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(0 [attr contingent] [subj. power] [op. pervade, cause] [dom- knowledge] [atti 
changeful]
We can see how the above fragment of an extended proposition (featuring only 
two attributes -  one for the subject and one for the domain -  and only two 
operator functions) might play a major role in “driving” a given philosophical 
discourse that will stress the pivotal role of fortuitously constituted power 
relations in society, and especially the dependence of disciplinary knowledge on 
such power relations. This discourse will accept that knowledge is marked by 
continuous change, but it will want to relate this characteristic to the chance 
transformations of power relations in a culture or a society. Such a discourse will 
feature typical “L-expressions” (that is, logosemantic expressions): actual senten­
ces from which logosemantic propositions, can (in part) be reconstructed. With 
reference to the proposition (i) above, compare, by way of example, the following 
three imaginery sentences:
•  “What gripped these thinkers was the disturbing vision of raw power seeping 
through the foundations of high theory ”
•  “What we know is a function of how we are controlled.”
• “This change in perception can now be seen to be the effect of different force- 
fields, accidentally coming together in the whole power structure we have 
been analysing.”
Besides the formal ontological kind of concepts featured in structure (i) above, 
logosemantics provides for a different level of representation -  where account is 
given of the images, metaphors and models that always complement these con­
cepts. For example, the discourse on power we have been analysing, might be 
inclined to speak figuratively of power (in a systematic way) in terms of, say, the 
strategies and tactics of war. We can represent this as in (ii) below, where 
“comp.” stands for the level o f complementary figures or tropes:4
00 [subj Power]
/comp, war/
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would also be inclined to present the proposition in the ftinction-argument form familiar from 
predicate logic, and also used in JackendofT s conceptual semantics (see note 7).
4 The war-model does actually feature in Foucault’s philosophy of power (cf. Foucault, 1980: 
114). Of course, there is much more to the matter of figurative complementisers than comes to 
the fore in this paragraph. For example, certain concepts on the first (formal-ontological) level, 
appear to be metaphoric in themselves, such as operators like ground or root for instance.
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2.2 Philosophical discourse in terms of time and type
Elements of the logosemantic structure we have been considering here, help to 
define different philosophical time-frames, as well as different types of philo­
sophical discourse. As regards the former, it is apparent that for example the 
logosemantic propositions of classic Greek metaphysics and scholastic thought, 
tend to select attributive concepts like constancy, necessity and universality on 
the subject-side. On the other hand, it is the opposites of the latter concepts, 
namely change, contingency and individuality, that are usually selected in modem 
anti-rationalist philosophies (such as existentialism for example) and also in 
postmodern thought. If we regard the general structure of logosemantic pro­
positions as part of a kind of universal conceptual grammar for philosophical 
discourse, then we can think of different attributive choices as contributing to the 
distinctive character of different philosophical languages, as it were. The author 
of the discourse that we will be analysing below, Fritjof Capra (1983:17) also on 
occasion refers to the “language” of a favoured philosophy, namely systems 
theory.
On the level of complementary tropes or figures, certain images, models and 
metaphors that are alligned with certain propositional subjects and their attributes, 
can also be typical of philosophical time-frames. In the case of postmodern 
thought for example, such figures are mostly meant to communicate a questioning 
of foundationalist thought. Typical examples are: labyrinth, network, abyss, void, 
absence, and so on.
As regards types of philosophical discourse, such as for example monistic versus 
dualistic, or structuralistic versus geneticistic philosophies, such types cut across 
different philosophical time-frames. We find them throughout the history of 
philosophical thought. Again we can relate such types to logosemantic para­
meters. In terms of the mentioned examples, we can conceive of monism as a 
single all-explanatory proposition underlying a given philosophical discourse, a 
proposition in which one and the same subject may operate on the material, as 
well as the psychological, social and cultural aspects of reality. Dualism, on the 
other hand, occurs when two such propositions (with different subjects) are active 
within the same discourse, the one imposing strict limits on the operational range 
of the other.5 Structuralistic thought, again, can be linked to a choice of attributes, 
operators and images that represent the predominance of form and structure over 
process; while geneticistic thought is characterised by the opposite of the latter 
tendency. With regard to the author with whom we are concerned in this article,
5 The single or double propositions referred to here, occupy a special “explanatory slot” within 
the larger set referred to in note 2 above.
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his basic conception appears to lean toward a monistic and geneticistic type of 
thought (Capra, 1983:27-31; 1985:288, 289, 315).
Consider another type of thought, very pertinent to the theme of this article. Since 
the time of the Greek thinkers, we periodically come across a type of philo­
sophical proposition in which the subject’s action upon its domain is conceived of 
in terms of the relation of a whole to its parts (with operators like enclose or 
unify), while the subject itself is conceptualised as either in itself a form of 
organic life, or as closely resembling the latter. This type of conception -  which 
can be referred to as an organistic universalism -  groups together such diverse 
thinkers as Plato, the nineteenth-century philosopher G.T. Fechner, and the early 
twentieth-century sociologist, Franz Oppenheimer. The analysis which will 
presently shed some light on the basic stucture of Capra’s thought, will show why 
I am of the opinion that he too belongs to this particular philosophical tradition. 
Of course, Capra’s interpretation of this organistic kind of thought is determined 
by a specific philosophical time-frame (roughly, that of a culture-critical paradigm 
going back to the early sixties) -  which differs much from the time-frames in 
which other exponents of this type were situated. In other words, there is both a 
continuity and a discontinuity to keep in mind here.
2.3 With regard to deconstructionism
To conclude this section, let me very briefly say something about decon­
structionism. In my view, philosophical discourse as such is determined by logo- 
semantic structures like those featured in (i) and (ii) above. In the study of 
logosemantics, we are confronted with an intricate conceptual machinery of 
which my introductory sketch gives the merest glimpse. I think that decon­
structionism has in its own way gained some remarkable insights into the nature 
of this “logocentric” kind of conceptualisation. But I take the deconstructionist 
dream of developing a discourse that can in some way escape the strictures of 
logosemantic principles of thought, to be misguided. To my mind, there are good 
reasons to believe that the said principles are part of our semantic competence to 
conceptualise at a certain level. They necessarily come into play when we want to 
say something of philosophical significance.6 Even the deconstructionists them­
selves cannot but give expression to basic logosemantic principles when they 
want to communicate in the mode of philosophical discourse (for instance by 
advancing some claim about the nature of textuality in relation to other social or
Frltjof Capra's holism and the structures o f philosophical conceptualisation ...
6 I am reminded here of Spaemann’s (1993:96) remark that every philosophy makes a claim to 
totality, and to be making no such claim is to be doing something that does not qualify as 
philosophy.
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cultural phenomena). Ultimately these principles may belong to a specialised 
capacity that forms part of the cognitive apparatus of the human mind.7
3. Kernel-propositions in holism and reductionism
Turning now to the philosophy espoused by Capra, let us indeed imagine this to 
be a (dialect of a) kind of (conceptual) language called “holism” . We all know 
that this language in which his books are written, is often compared (also by 
himself) to another language, that I will call “reductionism”. The language of re­
ductionism has served for centuries to express the thoughts of those who see 
reality in terms of one or two foundational structures from which all other 
structures are descended, the former often thought of in terms of mechanical 
models. In contrast, the newer language of holism serves those who see the cos­
mos as a systemic whole, comprised of interconnected relations and processes, 
where there are no ultimate foundations, and where the nature of the living 
organism is a more appropriate model than the structure of machines.
In terms of logosemantic structure, the difference between Capraist holism and 
reductionist languages become manifest at the level of kemel-propositions. The 
dualistic philosophy of Descartes, the father of modem reductionism, features two 
propositions that split reality in two parts: mind (with thought as basic de­
nominator) and matter (with filled space as basic denominator). Simplifying the 
kind of notation in (i) and (ii), we can informally represent this as follows:8
(iii) • [thought] [grounds] [spiritual reality]
/mathematical
analysis/
• [space] [grounds] [material reality]
/machine/
7 Compare the semantic theory developed in Jackendoff (1983, 1990). I would regard logo- 
semantics as ultimately a (future) sub-theory of the kind of conceptual semantics presented here.
8 In this and in the following presentations of logosemantic structures, the labelling of the 
bracketed categories is dropped, and the precise formulations of categorial content (drawing on 
the logosemantic lexicon and abstracting from syntactic convensions) are replaced, where this is 
convenient, by more informal terminology. The complementary model or metaphor related to 
subject, operator or domain, is here indicated by a “boxed” term (an underlined word between 
two slashes) written immediately underneath the element at issue. As regards the operator choice 
in the Cartesian propositions, ground features here as a typical and representative concept. A 
more thorough analysis will have to refer to the exact terms featured in Descartes’ own texts.
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What is problematic to the holistic point of view in this type of propositional 
structure is, in the first place, the appearance of two autonomous and separate 
subjects (analytical thought and filled space) that divide the rule over reality 
between them, as it were. Furthermore, a case of unjustified reductionism can be 
made against portraying all of what goes on in the spiritual world as mere modes 
of analytical reflection (the latter modelled on mathematical clarity), as well 
as against portraying all of inanimate nature, animate nature, the human body etc., 
as nothing but different modes of space-filling matter. Also, the modelling of 
material reality as some kind of machine goes against holism’s criticism of 
mechanistic modes of explanation, in which a totality is explained in terms of the 
sum of its constituent parts.9
The reductionist thought targeted by holism has come a long way since Descartes. 
It is, however, still active in for example much of modem physics and the 
philosophy underlying it. Here we would find kemel-propositions like the 
following:
(iv) [(subatomic) physical entities/forces] [ground] [the universe]
/construction, apparatus/
Apart from the reductionist understanding of (iv) implying that everything in the 
universe is ultimately just manifestations of physical entities, holism cannot abide 
this kind of proposition because it construes reality as something that is built upon 
foundations of some sort, foundations that scientists hope to uncover in the 
process of searching for the ultimate “building blocks” of the universe.
But now, unavoidably, the question as to holism’s own kemel-proposition arises. 
Given the holistic principle of working organically from the whole to its inter­
connected parts -  instead of proceeding mechanically in the Cartesian fashion 
from the constituent parts to the whole -  and given the fact that the largest whole 
with which we are confronted is the universe itself, the basic holistic proposition 
will be something like the following:10
Fritjof Capra's holism and the structures o f philosophical conceptualisation ...____________
9 For Capra’s criticism of Descartes, see e.g. Capra (1985:41-48). The analysis of propositional 
structure I present here, goes somewhat beyond what Capra actually says about Descartes, but 1 
believe it is wholly compatible with the holistic viewpoint, and perhaps even provides some 
additional considerations for this viewpoint to take into account.
10 Just as in the case of the operator ground in the Cartesian propositions, I am using the operator 
unify in this article in a representative sense -  other operators that are important in holistic 
thinking are integrate, enclose and organise. See especially Capra (1985:285-332) for the 
elements contained in the domain-category, in relation to the universe as a whole. (References to 
the models of the net and the web can be found throughout his work.) Capra seems to recognize 
the absolute status of the concept of universe in his thinking. He even associates the traditional 
concept of God with his assumption of a cosmic mind (Capra, 1985:317).
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(v) [the universe] [(ultimately) unifies] [matter, mind, culture, society] 
/organism, web, net/
The difference with the reductionist mode of thought thus lies in avoiding any 
dualistic (having recourse to at least two separate “God’s eye-view” pro­
positions), individualistic (reducing a whole to its basic parts) and mechanistic 
(having recourse to mechanical processes as a basic model) kind of thought. 
Instead of the model of the machine, holistic discourse utilises the model of the 
organism, signifying the idea of dynamic indivisible wholeness; also the models 
of the web or the net, in which everything is inter-connected and in which there 
are no “basic parts”.11 (The web/net -  together with the labyrinth -  is of course 
also a favourite model in postmodernist philosophy as a whole.)
When we talk about Capra’s holistic discourse, it must be noted that the latter has 
for some time now (since the writing of Capra, 1985) been informed by systems 
theory. Systems theory also looks at the world from the point of view of wholes 
that are much more than the mere sum of their parts. What is postulated here is a 
dynamic relation between systems and interrelated subsystems, the former being 
integrated into larger systems and so on, until we arrive at the ultimate system, 
the universe itself (cf. Capra, 1985:285-332; Laszlo, 1972:79, 80).
We must also be aware of the fact that the vast perspective afforded by systems 
theory, can in some sense be accommodated from the reductionist point of view. 
What I mean is that some reductionists may want to expand the cosmologist’s or 
physicist’s special scientific concept of universe, to a philosophical idea of origin: 
in other words a universe which features as the first and final frame of reference 
for our thinking on (not only matters of interest to the cosmologist but also) mind, 
science, culture and society, and so forth. When these last phenomena come 
“packaged” with the domain-concept in (iv) above, we have a rather remarkable 
(reversed) symmetry between this proposition and the holistic one featured in (v).
4. Extended propositions in holism and reductionism: 
simplicity and complexity
Focusing on the real theme of this article begins with our recognising “one” (or 
“unitary” or “single” or “simple”) versus “many” (or “multiple” or “complex”) as 
one of the pairs of concepts belonging to the set o f classic primary attributes. 
Together with the pairs: finite/infinite, constant/ changing, knowable/unknowable, 
necessary/contingent, universal/individual, it forms a set o f some very basic
11 It should be noted that on the other hand, Capra also makes statements where he argues for the 
relative applicability of the mechanistic or reductionist model (e.g. Capra, 1983:336; 1985:288). 
(See notes 12 and 14.)
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properties in terms of which the subject of a logosemantic proposition can be 
characterised. As I have already mentioned above, all of these pairs are also 
classic philosophical concepts: they crop up again and again when philosophical 
discourse has to say something about the logosemantic subjects it is always 
dealing with.
For the purposes of this article I will deal with the said pair of quantitative 
attributes in terms of one of the possible lexical identities the pair may assume, 
namely simple versus complex. Certain paradigm-uses seem to mark the 
appearance of the simple and the complex in philosophical discourse. For 
example, Greek metaphysics as a whole tended to devalue complexity in favour 
of the notion of an ultimate and totally undivided simplicity. Roughly, the former 
was characteristic o f the merely phenomenal, the latter o f the real noumenal 
world. This selective logic prevailed through medieval theology and philosophy, 
with the partless being of God representing the ultimate simplicity. The same 
logic continued to manifest itself in the modem period, coming strongly to the 
fore in the classic humanist philosophies of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, in methodological precepts and in epistemologies of both empiristic and 
rationalistic stamp (the former attending to the simple elements of sense-grounded 
knowledge; the latter to the simple ideas of innate knowledge and the trans­
cendental simplicity of the self). This logic has survived right up to the present 
day in a variety of discourses and discursive contexts. For example, Chomskyan 
psychology seems to assume -  in what amounts to a typical logosemantic pro­
position -  that the ultimate “principles of mind” that create (interactively and in a 
variety of “modules”) complex phenomena like language or science or morality or 
art, are essentially simple, and should be described in theories of conceptual 
simplicity (cf., e.g., Chomsky, 1980:248-254; 1981:14; 1982:30-31). However, 
when we turn to so-called postmodern discourse, we see that exactly the opposite 
tendency prevails. A deep sceptisism exists toward the very idea of structures and 
systems that order and thereby reduce and simplify; instead, the bewilderingly 
multiple and the teasingly complex have laid claim to a kind of revelatory truth. 
We are in fact dealing with what may be called a metaphysics of multiplying 
complexity.
Relating the issue of simplicity versus complexity to the discourses of 
reductionism and holism, it is apparent that the former qualifies its logosemantic 
subject in terms of that simplicity that grounds complexity. On the other hand, 
holism underlines the complexity of wholes or systems in which various elements 
(some of a relatively simple structure) are dynamically integrated and unified.12
12 A close reading of for example Capra (1985:285-332) will confirm that he sees the items of the 
domain-category exhibiting levels of relative simplicity. It is at such levels that for example the
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Thus, with respect to the subject-category, we can now expand the reductionist 
and the holistic propositions to respectively (vi) and (vii). (Note that in (vii) we 
have an example where both elements of an attribute pair are in fact selected to 
qualify the domain.)
/organism, web, net/
[complex and (on some levels relatively) simple (manifestations of)]
[matter, mind, culture, society]
Proposition (vi) is clearly at issue when the well-known phycisist, John Wheeler, 
referring to the quest for a super-unified theory in his discipline, voices the 
expectation that “Some day a door will surely open and expose the glittering 
central mechanism of the world in its beauty and simplicity”. Before quoting 
these words from Wheeler, physicist Paul Davies (1984:158) remarks that “Such 
an achievement would confirm the fond belief that the universe runs according to 
a single, simple, breathtakingly elegant mathematical principle”. (Note the mecha­
nistic metaphors in these utterances.)
On the other hand, it is proposition (vii) that is in evidence when Capra’s holism 
speaks of the “multidimensional” natural world as one of “infinite varieties and 
complexities” (1983:35); or (with reference to the small dimensions of the 
universe) waxes lyrical about the “complex dance of subatomic matter” (1983: 
278); or quotes a favourite thinker (Gregory Bateson) who finds the world be­
coming “prettier” the more of its complexity is revealed (1988:79).13 The tensive 
relation between the two propositions is made explicit when Capra (1985:70) 
affirms that “ [a]s we penetrate into matter, nature does not show us any isolated 
building blocks, but rather appears as a complicated web of relations between the 
various parts of a unified whole” .
reductionist approaches of behaviourism and mechanistic technology (in the spheres of mind or 
“mentation”, and of culture and society) can supposedly come to grips with certain phenomena.
13 The complexity of Capra’s universe is located on various levels. Most importantly, there is the 
small scale complexity of the subatomic world, the large scale complexity of the physical- 
cosmological universe, and the large scale complexity of the universe as the all-embracing 
system containing many other pait-systems.




(vii) [the complex] [universe] [unifies]
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Comparing holistic complexity (in Capra) to postmodern or post-structuralist 
(especially deconstructionist) complexity, we see some resemblance but also 
important differences. It is true that all these discourses of complexity criticize 
conceptual models that are associated with modernity, in particular the privi­
leging of “theory” and the latter’s quest for “grounds”, “foundations” and “basic 
building blocks” . These discourses all implement oppositional metaphors such 
as the web or the net. But still, they come from different directions and arrive 
at different conclusions. For example, a true postmodernist espousal o f frag­
mented complexity would still detect some kind of simplifying “grand narrative” 
in holism’s (systematising) discourse on science, nature and freedom. The holistic 
feeling for complexity, on the other hand, does not lead to the demonization of 
oneness and simplicity, that is typical of much of postmodern discourse. From a 
logosemantic perspective we can say that holism merely lets complexity (on the 
subject-side) rule over simplicity (on the domain-side);14 but that postmodernism 
problematises this rule (which will be seen as yet another attempt to construct 
some kind of hierarchical order in which our thought may come to rest) in the 
very name of (an ever-fracturing and fragmenting) complexity. In fact, the kind of 
deconstructionist critique developed by Derrida, will try to show the untenability 
of any clear-cut distinction between (in my terms) subject-attributes and domain- 
attributes, by which some central concept imposes its order and discipline. How­
ever, in this process the deconstructionist herself is dependent on a logosemantic 
concept of complex textuality, on “an indefinite multiplicity of recontextualiza- 
tions” (McCarthy, 1991:100), in which apparent oppositions dissolve and 
apparent unities fracture.15
5. The Eastern connection: spiritual freedom and the 
complexity of the world
From the very beginning of his writings, Capra has sought to establish links 
between a modem scientific view of the world, such as we find in the models of 
(non-reductionistically interpreted) subatomic physics, and the ancient spiritual 
traditions of the East, such as Taoism, Buddhism and Hinduism. The argument for
Fritjof Capra's holism and the structures o f philosophical conceptualisation ...____________
14 This conceptual rule, which has complexity “recognise” a certain presence of simplicity, allows 
Capra the possibility to give some space (but only on the domain-side of his proposition) to the 
reductionist capability of uncovering simplicity.
15 A Derridean approach to the text typically criticises other interpretations for not coming to grips 
with the full complexity of their material. As to the decentred concept of the sign, this forbids 
any longing after pure unicity and singularity (cf. Derrida, 1976:91). In a similar way Paul de 
Man conceives of the rhetorical complexity of textual allegories, offering a logosemantic 
proposition that gives to allegory the task of generating history (cf. De Man, 1979:277).
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such links, if successful, can help to undergird an important goal of Capra’s 
holism: the integration of spiritual wisdom with scientific knowledge.
In terms of the theme of this article, the important question for us is whether there 
are indeed some Eastern parallels to the logosemantic function of complexity in 
the holistic proposition featured above. (We thus leave aside for the moment 
other concepts which are at the forefront of Capra’s comparison, such as the 
dynamic character of reality, cosmic interrelatedness and so on.) To resolve this 
matter, one first of all has to reconstruct the basic propositions offered in those 
Eastern philosophies mentioned above, and then ascertain whether the simplicity/ 
complexity interpretation of these propositions agrees with that of our holistic 
discourse. However, instead of launching into a lengthy and technical analysis of 
the propositional structures on which the said philosophies are based, I will rather 
summarise the provisional results of my investigation on this score, and then get 
on with the comparative perspective.
• Taoism
Firstly, as far as Taoism is concerned, its propositional subject will be a concept 
of (“the way o f ’) nature or the universe. Without giving formal descriptions of 
operator and domain concepts, it is sufficient for our purpose here merely to keep 
in mind that the Taoist believes that the mysterious (the attribute “unknowable” is 
selected) way of nature shows us the right way to live, a way in which human 
beings realise their unity with nature (the operator pervade is frequently in 
evidence), let go of the urge to shape and control and “let things be”. As to the 
question how nature is attributed with respect to simplicity or complexity, the 
answer is that the “Great Tao”, being without divisions or distinctions, constitutes 
the ultimately simple “oneness underlying all the diversity and multiplicity of the 
world” (Koller, 1985:288). (Notice the proposition-like expression contained in 
this quote ) Clearly, the Taoist proposition, with respect to the positioning of 
simplicity and complexity, seems to be at odds with (vii) above.
• Hinduism
Secondly, as far as Hinduism is concerned, the logosemantic story is more or less 
the same, with Brahman replacing the Tao. In the Upanishads Brahman is the 
name given to the ultimate external reality. It pervades all, is infinite, unknow­
able, and unchangeable. In the Vedas this ultimate source is referred to as “That 
One”, and among the properties ascribed to it, there is the attribute of indivisible 
wholeness or ultimate simplicity. This is also one of the characteristics of the 
universe we find in the BhagavadGita (Koller, 1985:19-40).16
'6 The ultimate simplicity of Brahman may be conceptualised in different ways: for example either 
as an absolute unity without any parts whatsoever, or as a whole of which the parts merge into 
oneness (cf. Koller, 1985:94-96).
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•  Buddhism
Thirdly, we come to Buddhism. According to Buddhist teaching, a correct insight 
into the true nature of reality can free us from suffering. And this true reality, 
which is also the true nature of the enlightened person (and carries the status of a 
logosemantic subject) is one of ceaseless flux, in which all things are inter­
connected. Our suffering is caused by thinking and living in a way which is out of 
tune with this reality. As regards the question whether this reality is simple or 
complex, it seems to me there is some ambiguity in Buddhist teaching on 
this score.17 Although the basic view seems to be that of (external and internal) 
reality as a flowing process constituted by many different interacting elements 
(dharmas), there are also certain traditions that seem to think of the enlightened 
Buddha nature as one that can be distinguished from the empirical world of the 
compounded and the fluctuating (cf., eg., Humphreys, 1951:74, 80, 94, 96, 128). 
Especially in Zen Buddhism, there is an explicit acceptance of the undivided 
nature of true reality, a primordial singleness before the complex contrasts created 
by ordinary discursive thought. It seems then that in the Buddhist tradition one 
can think o f ultimate reality either in terms of ceaseless flux and complexity 
(compoundedness), or singleness and transcendence of change (Humphreys, 1951: 
74); or, one can reckon with two ultimate realities -  the one (unitary and beyond 
change) finally transcending the other (compounded and flowing), such as we find 
in the Abhidharmist teaching for example (Koller, 1985:167).
This last approach rests on a logosemantic structure that has an initial subject 
operating on a domain, which then acts as a subject itself in relation to another 
domain. This kind of structure is also in evidence in, for example, the Christian- 
theological view which holds the world to have been created through the Logos, 
who is eternally generated by the Father, the latter in this respect transcending or 
preceding the Son. Here we see the concept of God functioning as the first 
propositional subject, and that of the Redeemer-Word as the second propositional 
subject. As another example, compare a theory which holds natural evolution 
(first subject) to be the origin of mind, and the latter (second subject) to be the 
origin of, say, culture and society.
With reference to the attributes o f simplicity and complexity, this logosemantic 
“stacking” of propositions in (some strands of) Buddhist thinking can be 
represented roughly as in (viii) below:
(viii) • [a single] [reality] [transcends] [complex] [nature]
• [complex] [nature] [pervades] [all that exists]
Fritjof Capra's holism and the structures o f philosophical conceptualisation...____________
17 For a penetrating discussion of different approaches, see Koller (1985: 151-225)
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Coming now to the similarities Capra sees between Eastern thought and his 
favourite scientific theories of the universe, it seems as though some problems 
exist in this respect. Basically, it boils down to the following:
•  First of all, it is not clear that all Eastern philosophies that ascribe a 
propositional subject-function to some or other concept of nature, view the 
latter as ultimately simple (a unity without any multiplicity whatsoever). This 
contrary to Capra’s (1983:141) claim that “ [t]he Eastern traditions constantly 
refer to this ultimate, indivisible reality which manifests itself in all things ...” 
Specifically in the case of some Buddhist discourses18, the very opposite 
seems to be the case. They depict “real” nature not in terms of a preceding 
simplicity and unchangingness19 but in terms of infinite flux and complexity. 
At most the “oneness” that one can conceive of here, is that of the inseparable 
net of forces and relations. But what gets to be stressed in the Buddhist story 
about ultimate reality that I am referring to, is the multiplicity of all-pervading 
forces over and against illusionary unity and singleness. If all this is so, then 
one cannot really speak of an Eastern spirituality which is the same in its basic 
elements.
• Secondly, it is in fact only the Buddhist belief in an ultimate complexity (of 
interrelated processes of change), that can be compared to scientific holism’s 
faith in a universe which is the last word in systemic complexity.
• Thirdly, Capra’s references to the indivisibleness (or oneness) of reality he 
sees depicted in the Eastern traditions, are also problematic on another level. 
For, in logosemantic terms, the crucial question is whether this indivisibility -  
in a given context -  relates to the propositional attribute of ultimate (partless) 
simplicity, or to the unifying operation the propositional subject performs on 
its domain, binding many parts into an encompassing and integrated unity. The 
notion of an indivisible reality means two different things in these two 
different senses. Strictly speaking, the Eastern belief in an undivided whole­
ness that is in some sense beyond all separate things (such as evidenced in the 
concept of Brahman for example), is not really comparable to the holistic 
theory of an indivisible universe in which all things are (merely) interrelated 
(Capra, 1983:142, 151, 319). It is also not just a matter of the Eastern mystic 
going further than the holistic scientist in experiencing the unity of all things 
(Capra, 1983:154). Rather it is a matter of the paradigmatically incom­
18 See Capra’s own reference (1983.155) to Lama Govinda who talks about a net of forces and 
relations.
19 Like that accorded to Brahman for instance, cf. Koller (1985:24-25, 34, 40); Morgan 
(1953:117-122).
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mensurable difference between an ancient metaphysics of absolute simplicity 
(also found in Greek thought) on the one hand, and a modern science of 
irreducible complexity on the other hand. The former kind of changeless unity 
is fundamentally at odds with both systemic complexity and systemic unity: it 
stands to the latter as truth to illusion.
6. The rhetorics of complexity
In this section I want to focus more closely on the general conceptual architecture 
within which philosophical notions of complexity (or simplicity) function. This in 
order to see how this architecture allows certain attributive manoeuvers or strate­
gies that are effective in “selling” a given propositional truth like that of holism.
6.1 Both ordinary and awesome
When studying the structure of logosemantic propositions, one soon notices some 
interesting rhetorical effects concerning the role of attributes like simple/complex. 
On the one hand, such attributes seem to be pointing only to what are very 
evident and very basic characteristics of the subject concerned (for example, that 
it is simple or complex, changing or unchangeable, necessary or contingent, and 
so on). On the other hand, these very same attributes have an unmistakable aura 
o f distinction and gravity about them, in the context of philosophical discourse. 
Consider how the status of a propositional subject may be underlined by 
depicting it as either changeless or dynamic, either universal or individual, either 
necessary or contingent. O f the same importance is the subject’s pleasing sim­
plicity or its deep complexity -  depending of course, on one’s paradigmatic 
presuppositions concerning the admirable option in these choices. Thus certain 
thinkers (including reductionists) will feel proud to have as the subject of their 
discourse some “very simple” mechanisms or principles in a given field. Other 
thinkers (including holists) will feel equally proud to point their followers to 
“extremely complex” systems that must be investigated.
6.2 Esthetic appeal
Sometimes status-marking attributes may even be linked to some kind of esthetic 
evaluation. In the case of simplicity, we have already referred to qualifications 
such as “elegance”, “glitter” and “beauty” (in pronouncements by Chomsky and 
Wheeler for example), and in the case of complexity, we have noted associations 
with “dance” and “prettiness” (Capra and Bateson).20
20 Ancient and scholastic theories of beauty are particularly preoccupied with mathematical 
analogies, such as simplicity and symmetry (cf. Visagie, 1984:30-31). These analogies, 
however, are also central to the physicist’s notion of beauty, according to Paul Davies
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6.3 Stark contrast
One way in which a philosophical discourse may highlight the eminence of its 
propositional subject in relation to a particular domain is to have contrasting attri­
butes apply to subject and domain, as in (ix) below (where the arrow symbolises 
some or other operator binding a subject X to a domain Y, and X and Y are quali­
fied by the opposing members of an attribute pair).
(ix) [+A][X] - >  [Y][-A]
Thus we have in medieval theology the infinite God over and against the finite 
world, in ancient metaphysics the changeless noumenal realm over and against 
the ever-changing phenomenal realm, or in modern-day psychology or physics 
the ultimately simple principles of mind or matter over and against the complex 
universe. One may note in this regard that Capra’s holism does not incorporate 
this kind of stark attributive contrast: the ultimate governing system, in its 
complexity, is not arraigned against simplicity as such, but rules a domain in 
which subsystems of varying simplicity and complexity are incorporated (cf. 
structure vii above).
6.4 Internal attribution
The first function of a propositional attribute is to describe or qualify the subject 
of the proposition. But on occasion it may also be employed to describe another 
attribute, so as to underline the status of the latter. For instance, the attribute of 
individuality (pertaining to the subject of, say, human existence) may be 
“enhanced” by conceptualising it as an ever-changing individuality. Or the 
attribute of unity, in pertaining to the subject o f reason, may be conceptualised as 
“transitory” {temporally finite), presumably to render this unity more attractive to 
a postmetaphysical world (cf. Habermas, 1992:117); or the attribute of com­
plexity, pertaining to a postmodern celebration of textuality, may be enhanced by 
calling attention to the further complicating factor of the utter contingency of this 
complexity.
In the case of the discourse under discussion, this kind of internal attribution 
(attributes referring to each other internally instead of externally to the subject) 
is manifested when Capra (e.g. 1983:35, 151, 265) writes about the “infinite” 
complexity of the universe. The already imposing stature of complexity as an 
ordinary/extraordinary attribute is hereby further magnified.
(1984:221). Davis (1984:122) refers to Dirac and Einstein in this regard, and quotes another 
statement by John Wheeler, where the latter says that “[t]he beauty in the laws of physics is the 
fantastic simplicity that they have”, and that the “ultimate mathematical machinery” that is 
behind it all, is “surely the most beautiful of all”.
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The recursive application of this rule of internal attribution can also produce the 
concept o f an incomprehensible -  because of its infiniteness -  complexity: the 
idea of a complexity that is so far beyond measure that it transcends our under­
standing. Compare the structure (x), where the left-pointing arrows indicate the 
successive qualification of attributes:
(x) [[complex] <__ [infinite]] <__ [unknowable] [X] —> [Y]
It is probably a version of this two-fold attributive coupling that is at issue when 
Capra (1983:35) informs us that the natural world, being of infinite variety and 
complexity, is one which “our abstract system of conceptual thinking can never 
describe or understand [. ..] completely”.
An interesting phenomenon that can be observed in this regard is the way that 
different discourses, or different points of view, couple unknowability to different 
status-attributes. For instance, in Buddhist writings the limitations of conceptual 
knowledge will also be stressed, but here the unknowableness of reality is often 
connected, not to complexity as such, but rather to unending flux  (cf. Capra, 
1983:308; Koller, 1985:157). Hinduist thinking, on the other hand, will tend to 
predicate the unknowability of ultimate reality on its attribute of absolute sim­
plicity.21 The relative advantage of the “complexity option” among these choices 
is that it speaks more authoritatively to an audience schooled in the tradition of 
modem Western science.
To end this subsection on internal attibution, let me point out another mechanism 
by which an attribute such as “unknowable” may act upon the pair “simple/ 
complex” . Instead of “unknowable” enhancing the selected attribute “complex”, 
the former attribute may, from its position as a central, qualifying attribute, act 
upon the other attributes in such a way that the very distinction between the 
different members of a pair (such as “simple/complex”) gets to be blurred. In this 
case, the discourse will make a point o f (in the end) not choosing between the 
members o f an attribute pair. Compare the following statement:
[l]f our interest lies in reviewing fundamental problems o f knowledge and 
understanding, then we find complexity paradigmatic and logical, where there 
is no pure principle, no unique law, no formula unifying the universe, ju s t the 
conjunction o f  logically contradictory principles and a growing obscurity 
towards the unthinkable, inconceivable, unsayable [...] To conclude, I would 
say that reality is neither simple nor complex. It is something else. It is 
enormous, outside any standards, unheard of, it is incredible, it presents many 
faces depending on our questions. [...] [TJhere is more to reality than the 
human mind is aware o f  (Morin, 1985:67-68).
Fritjof Capra's holism and the structures o f philosophical conceptualisation ...____________
21 In the case of the oldest Vedantic tradition, for example, cf. Koller (1985:85-86).
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I must add that one often gets the impression that the explicit refusal to choose 
between certain attributes on account of a central qualifying attribute such as 
“unknowable” or “changeful”, does not in the end escape an implicit favouring of 
one of the members of such pairs, as indicative of the broad direction in which the 
supposed transcendence of binary choice is actually conceptualised. Thus, we 
may find that a refusal to opt for either simplicity or complexity is informed, at 
bottom, by what I will call a second order idea of complexity being tied to the 
concept of our humble ignorance: that of which we are ignorant is so un­
imaginably complex, that any simple choice between simple versus complex, is 
not feasible anymore. (This is probably the kind of reasoning going on in the 
quotation above.) Compare also the deconstructionist critique of a unitary 
privileging of complexity over unitariness -  a critique that is itself in the debt of a 
second order idea of complexity (as I substantively argued at the end of section 4 
above). A somewhat similar situation obtains in Eastern thought, when the choice 
between constancy and flux can be rejected on account o f a second-order idea, an 
all-pervading flux of such dimensions that it seemingly makes any kind of stance 
on the subject of permanence/impermanence problematic.
6.5 Promotion to the very top
The “discovery” of a prepositional subject is usually communicated with 
reference to certain status-marking attributes. For instance, a subject such as 
“nature” can be marked by its supposed infinity (over and against the finiteness of 
cultural or societal phenomena), or a subject such as “history” or “society” by its 
supposed contingency (over and against the apparently necessary laws we 
encounter in the mathematical, physical or biogical worlds). These status-marking 
attributes may feature so prominently in a thinker’s mind, that they eventually 
undergo a “subjectification”, that is, they are promoted to the rank o f pro- 
positional subjects. Technically, one can formulate a logosemantic movement-rule 
in this respect -  a rule by which an attribute moves into the subject-position, and 
the displaced subject moves into a (non-binary) attributive position, qualifying the 
moved attribute. Compare structure (xi) below where the broken arrow indicates 
the “route” of an attribute to the subject-position, the original subject X being 
moved to a descriptive position:
(xi) [X] [A]—[—> ] - >  [Y]
Thus, in terms of the above examples, we can have pronouncements on (nature’s) 
infinity enveloping the individual things within nature or society, or on pure 
(social) contingency underlying the epistemic and institutional structures that 
seem so essential and inevitable to most people. The first of these possible 
propositions is already in evidence in the thought of the ancient Greek philo­
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sopher Anaximander; the second proposition is exemplified in the writings of the 
contemporary American philosopher Richard Rorty.22
With respect to Capra’s holism, a similar kind of conceptualisation of complexity 
can be found in the remarks of a physicist, Geoffrey Chew, whom Capra regards 
as a pioneer of non-foundationalist physics. These remarks are quoted in Capra 
(1988) and they are meant to be illustrative of what Capra takes to be radically 
holistic thinking in the realm of physics.23 In Chew’s view, then, we find that the 
complex nature of (subatomic) physical processes are such that they can be 
regarded as the origin not only of (macroscopic) space-time but even of our 
concept of consciousness (Capra, 1988:61). The former domain presents us with 
the apriori context found in “Cartesian reality” and in classical physics. In this 
space-time world, emerging from complex physical events, is found the kind of 
relative simplicity that makes classical descriptions of reality (separate objects 
existing in space and time) possible. Notice how, in this conception of Chew, 
simplicity on the domain-side (where it may also move from domain-attribute to 
substantive domain) comes to contrast with complexity on the subject-side. 
Indeed, the notion of complexity assumes such centrality in this model that one 
can say that “complexity ... produces effective simplicity” (Capra, 1988:62). This 
is the very opposite of the view that the universe (and space-time) represent 
“complexity frozen out of simplicity” (Davies, 1984:160).24 Here, then, we see 
complexity taking on the role of a propositional subject, reigning majestically 
over the grand simplicity of reductionist physics, and over the once mighty 
kingdom o f space and time.
A structurally similar conceptualisation is found in the thought of the Jesuit priest- 
paleontologist, Teilhard de Chardin, whom Capra (1985) also cites approvingly.
Frltpf Capra's holism and the structures o f philosophical conceptualisation ...
22 Regarding Rorty, a clear example of the kind of logosemantic proposition at issue here is found 
in Rorty (1989:22), where he speaks of language, conscience and community being the product 
of time and chance.
23 Note again that when the field of subatomic physics is at issue, the holistic proposition 
reconstructed in (vii) above, applies in terms of the microphysical aspect of the universe.
24 Space and time are obviously highly prized as possible elements of a propositional domain. 
Apart fïom the examples cited in the text above, consider also a view expressed by Michael 
Green, a prominent exponent of superstring theory, that space and time might in some sense be 
built out of the “strings” that this theory postulates (in Davies & Brown, 1988:125). Or, to 
move to completely different fields of discourse, consider the post-structuralist idea that 
textuality is not so much determined in space and time, as that the latter are engendered in and 
through our experience of written reality (cf. Habermas, 1992:214-15); or the view that modem 
computer technology (electronic communication) is indeed able to “reconfigure space and time 
coordinates” (Mark Poster, s.j .:2) And then of course there are the theological propositions that 
have God ruling not only over the spatial world but also over all of time.
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In the context of his theory of evolution (which understands evolution to be 
moving in the direction of increased complexity), Teilhard views consciousness 
as “the specific effect of organised complexity”, which Capra (1985:331) notes is 
“perfectly compatible with the systems view of mind”. The same kind of con­
ceptualisation is also present in Gregory Bateson’s view that (in the words of 
Capra) “mind is a necessary and inevitable consequence of a certain complexity” 
(Capra, 1985:315).
A concept that on occasion also appears in the role of propositional subject in 
Capra’s discourse is that of “interconnectedness”, together with the metaphors of 
the web or the network. Thus we might read of the quantum interconnectedness 
of the whole universe being the fundamental reality, that embraces relatively 
independent parts that are “merely” particular and contingent forms within this 
whole (Capra, 1983:150, cf. 1988:50-70). Again the conceptual mechanics be­
hind this appears to involve the movement of an attribute of the physical 
processes constituting the microphysical aspect of the propositional subject: 
universe. This time the attribute does not involve an intuition of number (like 
simple and complex) but of space, and it does not even belong (like simple and 
complex) to the set o f classic binary attributes. But this “ordinary” attribute, 
namely “interconnected” (with its attendant metaphors) may also attain to the 
rank of a propositional subject. And again this governing interconnectedness may 
be qualified as “complex” (Capra, 1983:150).
6.5.1 Determining the power of promoted elements
When an attribute comes into the propositional subject-position, it has access to 
the operational power wielded from this position. It holds power over a domain 
that can consist of one or more elements, which domain can be smaller or larger 
than other domains controlled by other subjects. The larger the domain, in terms 
of the levels or categories of reality that it encompasses, the greater is the power 
of the subject, the greater is its status in comparison with other propositional 
subjects, and the greater is the awe and respect it commands from the audience to 
whom it is being introduced.
In the case of holistic complexity, we have seen that its (projected) domain 
comprises not only the whole of objective reality in space and time, but even 
human consciousness as well -  that is to say, just about the whole of reality as it 
is often conceptualised: the “inner” world of the perceiving subject and the 
“outer” world of phenomena and objects (strikingly reminiscent of the old 
Cartesian perspective). One can scarcely imagine how more power can be 
bestowed upon a promoted attribute.
6.5.2 Concerning complexity theory and chaos theory
References over the last couple of years to the emerging “new science” of 
complexity (which, according to some, also embraces chaos theory), raises the
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question whether this notion of complexity indeed presupposes the kind of 
“promotion” that we have been discussing, and whether it is in fact reconcilable 
to Capra’s holism. The short answer to both questions seems to be that, while 
there is indeed a certain overlap between holism and complexity theory (for 
example the concern with complex, dynamic and self-organising systems), and 
while complexity theory allows for a certain order to be generated from 
complexity, the overall aim of the latter theory still seems to be to finally relate 
systemic complexity to some simple underlying rules. For example Lewin 
(1993:14) quotes Murray Gell-Mann in this regard on “surface complexity arising 
out of deep simplicity”.25 In logosemantic terms, we thus have complexity 
operating on something like, say, nature, consciousness and society, with this 
whole operation taking place on the domain-side of a proposition in which 
simplicity is the governing attribute on the subject-side. Compare (xii) below:
(xii) [simplicity] —> [[complexity] —> [nature, etc.]]
(In general, we have a similar encapsulation of operations on the domain-side, 
whenever there is some kind of internal governing relation at stake among the 
entities that constitute the domain -  for example, when a deconstructionist pro­
position has something like “textuality” ruling such spheres as philosophy, 
science, literature, politics and so on, with philosophy at the root o f the rest -  cf. 
McCarthy, 1991:102.)
But now note that, to the kind of holistic thinking we are concerned with here, the 
reasoning based on (xii) must seem to be reintroducing something of the classic 
reductionist ideal into the study of complexity. In fact, the propositional 
subjectivisation of simplicity might be taken to belong to the logosemantic 
foundations of chaos theory (cf. Gleick, 1987:304). Thus one can immediately 
understand why someone like Chomsky would have a definite “taste” for this 
theory as a kind of metadisciplinary framework (Haley & Lunsford, 1994:127­
128, 141-143).
7. In critique of complexity
7.1 The attributive positioning of complexity
In the above sections, we have been undertaking a logosemantic analysis of the 
structures o f philosophical conceptualisation, with special reference to the 
concept o f complexity -  all in the context of a discussion of Capra’s holism. The 
question, however, arises: is there any way from this kind of descriptive theory to
Fritjof Capra's holism and the structures of philosophical conceptualisation ...____________
25 Compare also Lewin (1993:190), where the importance of an underlying simplicity is again 
established
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a critical evaluation of the actual content of logosemantic propositions? I believe 
there are indeed such critical perspectives to be developed, and in the following 
subsections I will try to illustrate this, again with reference to Capra’s theory. The 
first issue concerns the attributive positioning of complexity.
It is apparent that the basic holistic proposition we have been investigating, tends 
to attribute complexity to the propositional subject, locating simplicity -  together 
with subordinate forms of complexity -  on the domain-side. This allocation of 
attributes stands in direct opposition to the reductionist kind of proposition where 
simplicity reigns over complexity. Let us proceed by imagining a conceptual 
process where the category “slots” of the holistic proposition are systematically 
being “filled in”. Coming to the imaginary question: “is the propositional subject 
(the cosmos or universe) one or many?” we can expect to find the concept “one” 
being selected (by the holistic thinker). Together with the operator unify, this 
accounts for Capra’s insistence on the oneness of the universe (e.g. Capra, 1983: 
190). However, we have seen that the attribute-pair at issue here also goes under 
the label “simple/complex”. When the question of suitable attributes is phrased in 
this way, our holistic proposition seems to select the latter alternative (as 
structure (vii) above indicates). But the difficulty in this respect is that the 
concept of complexity is indissolubly (transformationally) linked to the concept of 
multiplicity. This problematises any one-sided option for unity or oneness over 
and against multiplicity, as far as the propositional subject (the universe) is con­
cerned.
On the other hand, the concept of simplicity which is moved to the domain-side 
of our proposition, is itself indissolubly linked to that of unity, singleness or 
oneness. What we should see, is that the oneness o f  the universe is given 
together with the multiplicity to which this oneness relates, a multiplicity that 
confronts us in the infinite complexity o f  the universe, this complexity being 
countered or balanced by the referred to oneness, which is nothing but an 
element o f  relative simplicity amidst enormous complexity 26 Put in another way: 
even the most jubilant celebration of quantum complexity must still be related to 
the single reality in which everything exists. And even theories of multiple 
universes seem conceptually forced to reckon with some kind of unity, for 
instance that of the quantum context itself. In terms of systems-language: if the
26 A typical problem encountered by the metaphysical celebration of the one over and against the 
many, is stated by Habermas (1992:120-121) in this way: “How can the one, without 
endangering its unity, be everything (Alles), if the universe (das All) is indeed composed of 
many different things?” (Habermas’s own central logosemantic proposition, featuring a certain 
kind of rationality in the subject-position, seems at times to contain sets of balanced binary 
attributes, for example in the mentioned essay he argues for the unity of reason as given only 
within the diversity of its “voices”, and for the need to honour both the universality and the 
particularity (individuality) of linguistically mediated reason. Compare also note 27 below.)
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complexity of the ultimate reality is of a systemic nature, then the system as such 
imposes unity, singleness and a measure of simplicity.
A brief side-remark here: if there may be reason to doubt whether society as such 
is to be viewed as an encompassing whole with constituent parts (cf. section 7.5 
below), then it seems the same kind of doubt might be brought to bear on the idea 
of the universe as such an all-inclusive whole. Might it not at least be feasible to 
think of the universe as an ordered coherence of many different structures 
(material, biological, psychological, social and so on), without the latter being 
“located within” a single total structure (mostly pictured in purely material 
terms)? But note that, even if this was indeed correct, we would not end up with a 
rampant diversity or complexity without any correlating unity or singularity: the 
complexity of the cohering, intertwined structures would still be balanced by the 
unity of the cosmic order that links them all to one another.
Turning for a moment toward the reductionist celebration of simplicity, what 
needs to be realised by searchers after a so-called “theory of everything”, is that 
the beautiful simplicity of the envisioned single formula, will of necessity be 
embedded in reasoning processes, one can say a mathematical matrix, of great 
complexity -  that is, the simple formula cannot be understood (as simple) in any 
simple way. Michael Green, one of the originators of modem string theory (by 
many physicists regarded as the most promising candidate for a “theory of 
everything”), has on occasion remarked on this kind of simplicity that can only be 
envisaged in the context o f sophisticated mathematics, and his collaborator, John 
Schwarz, has even expressed concern that the mathematics required for an 
accurate elaboration of the ultimate theory, may be beyond the capacities of the 
human mind (cf. Davies & Brown, 1988:87, 132).
To generalise: In the case of holism, it seems as if  a logosemantic opposition 
between unity and multiplicity, or between simplicity and complexity, is frought 
with all kinds of conceptual tensions and is wide open to “deconstructive” 
criticism. One might surmise that the same will be the case with other discourses 
(focused on other propositional subjects) bent on systematically choosing 
between the simple and the complex. We can speculate that this will also prove to 
be the case with the other attributes, when it comes to the oppositional relations 
that philosophical discourses are forever construing between binary elements. 
(The practitioners of deconstruction have gone some way in illustrating this -  in 
spite of the fact that their own method operates on selective “second-order” 
ideas. See section 6.4 above.)
The kind of conceptual balance we probably need to practise in this respect, is 
not so much a question of empirical “findings”, as it is of a preceding conceptual 
adjustment that needs to be made -  an adjustment in which we are not so 
predisposed to attribute to our propositional subject, whatever this may be, either
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unity (simplicity) or multiplicity (complexity), either individuality or universality, 
either necessity or contingency, and so on.27 Capra himself frequently urges us to 
look critically at the conceptual imbalances with which we approach not only our 
broad cultural environment (1983:15), but also our theoretic and scientific 
endeavours. One cannot but agree with him when he observes (1985:77):
The patterns scientists observe in nature are intimately connected with the 
patterns o f  their minds; with their concepts, thoughts, and values. Thus the 
scientific results they obtain and the technological applications they investigate 
will be conditioned by their frame o f mind.
From the systems point of view Capra even gives an example (1985:290) of how 
the traditionally antithetic concepts of freedom and determinism should be 
harmonised with each other, both being relative concepts and both applying to the 
same system at the same time: to the extent that the latter is autonomous from its 
environment, it is free; to the extent that it is dependent, it is determined. 
Similarly, he balances the stability of self-organising systems against their 
incessant change (1985:292), and chance against necessity as “complementary 
principles” (1985:312). Even holism and reductionism are said to be capable of 
harmonious co-existence, if the “proper balance” is maintained (1985:288). In 
another context, while not consciously balancing attributes, he nevertheless 
remarks -  in the same paragraph -  on both the comparative simplicity of viruses, 
and on their high molecular complexity (1985:298).
It is also with such examples in mind, that I would (again) contend that even the 
most complex system has an element of relative simplicity -  to the extent that it 
presents itself as a unified whole. One could also look at this from the point of 
view of the structure of our concepts. For, though our concept of something like 
“universe” obviously entails a multiplicity of elements, these are synthesised in 
the unifying grasp of one single concept.
Note that this interpretation of simplicity and complexity tends, in the first place, 
to handle these attributes as complementary aspects or viewpoints related (in 
principle) to one and the same object or category. (I say “in principle”, because, 
naturally, in ordinary communication, all of us will, in a given context and within 
relative parameters, qualify something either as simple or as complex.) Thus 
perceptual complexity, for example, implies a corresponding perceptual and not,
27 The balance referred to here, is particularly important when confronting the whole debate on 
postmodernism Cf. Thomas McCarthy’s perceptive remark (1991:13) that “[t]he grand 
‘either/or’ structuring [of] much of postmodernist rhetoric sets the particular against the 
universal: either one is for the totality, necessity, authority, and homogeneity of the universal, or 
one rejects it in the name of the fragmentary, contingent, spontaneous, and heterogeneous 
particular. But that opposition simply ignores the dialectical relation between the general and the 
particular”.
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say, a conceptual unity or simplicity (as one finds in Kant’s epistemology for 
instance). Similarly, an ant colony is, as such, both a complex structure and a 
unified, single, whole. One does not have to couple the notion of complexity to 
the colony as a whole, and that o f simplicity only to the structure of the individual 
ant (as Douglas Hofstadter [quoted in Davies, 1984:63] seems to do, though he 
does make the point that one should not oppose holistic complexity and 
reductionistic simplicity to each other). In the same way one can come to 
understand the most ordinary social situations experienced by human beings as 
amazingly complex in the very simplicity that makes them experienceable (cf. 
Searle, 1995:3-4). Again, the categorially unified kind of complementarity I am 
talking about here, seems to inform some of Capra’s own examples of correlative 
viewpoints (cited above).
7.2 The schematization of complementary attributes
When both elements of an attribute-pair apply in a logosemantic proposition, they 
are usually “schematized” according to some or other order or pattern. Let me 
briefly describe three such possible schematizations with reference to the 
simplicity/complexity pair. These are in fact some of the available options that a 
thinker has in terms of conceptualising the relations between any pair of 
attributes.
•  First there is what I will call the paradoxical schematization-. here a con­
ception is structured in which the propositional subject will be viewed as both 
simple and complex, in the sense of the one attribute “turning into the other” 
as soon as we focus our attention on it, thereby confounding the logical norms 
of “ordinary” thinking. (In some types of mysticism, this type of unity of op­
posites is ultimately left behind in a conception in which the “both ... and ...” 
merely points from afar to the “real” nature of the subject: an absolute and 
partless unity beyond all opposites -  in which case we again have the ultimate 
selection of simplicity over and against complexity.)
•  Secondly, there is what I call the ontological schematization: an effort is made 
to distinguish analytically between the simplicity and the complexity of the 
propositional subject by referring (mostly) the former attribute to the assumed 
“essence” of the subject as it exists in itself, and the latter attribute to the way 
the subject “appears” to us.28
•  Thirdly, there is what 1 will refer to as the functional schematization: without 
resorting to either a paradoxical or an ontological complementarity, simplicity
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is seen as characterising the subject from a certain point of view, and 
complexity as characterising it from another. This brief overview will suffice 
as regards the three types of schematized complementarity I wanted to 
mention here. The schematization component can now be added to our 
representation of propositional structure, as in (xiii) below, applying to the 
attributes under discussion.
(xiii) fsimple plus complexl [X] —> [Y] 
schematization options
To my own mind, it is only the functional type of schematization that really 
succeeds in avoiding the pitfalls of a mystical irrationalism on the one hand 
(seeking to escape the norms of logical thought), and a metaphysical rationalism 
on the other (assuming a world of hidden substances behind apparent reality). 
Thus I do not think that the kind of complementarity between simplicity and 
complexity that I have been postulating, should be viewed as an example of the 
“unification of opposite concepts” that Capra (1983:161-175) sees in Eastern 
philosophy and in modern physics. Such a unity leads either to a postulated 
merging of simplicity and complexity (“unity between opposites”), or to the 
transcending and absolute simplicity of the propositional subject (“unity beyond 
opposites”), again excluding the notion of a complementary complexity.29
7.3 Where unity cannot be balanced with multiplicity
The gist of the discussion in the immediately preceding sections has been that a 
kind of logosemantic balance may be achieved between the attributes of (among 
others) simplicity and complexity. This also holds for the appearance of these 
attributes under the labels of, respectively, unity and multiplicity. However, in a 
certain respect, there does appear to be an interesting imbalance, so to speak, 
between these attributes under the latter labels.
This concerns the “power potential” of the concepts concerned. It has been 
established above that the logosemantic category of “operators” comprises the 
possible relations between subjects and their domains, and it appears as if these 
are essentially power relations. Now, the concept of unity may function in a 
logosemantic proposition in the “operator” slot, whenever a certain x unifies (and 
in a sense simplifies) a certain y. This is not the case with the concept of multi­
plicity: unlike the notion of unity, it apparently cannot receive an operational 
role. There are, to my knowledge, no examples of genuine logosemantic pro­
29 The issue of “unity between” versus “unity beyond” is somewhat similar to an old paradox in 
the unity-metaphysics of Western philosophy: the one is regarded as in everything, and at the 
same time, in order to maintain its distinctive unity, as above everything (Habermas, 1992:121).
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positions that have some or other x powerfully operating on a domain y, by 
multiplying or diversifying (or complexifying) y. In this respect, the “power 
valence” o f these two concepts is asymmetrical. Thus we must distinguish 
between the general status potential of attributes (by which a certain aura of 
distinction may be effected, cf. section 6.1 above), and their operational potential. 
In terms of the former criterion, the one and the many have equal chances; in 
terms of the latter criterion, the one seems to be privileged over the many -  and 
this simply on account of the way that human thought (apparently) works.
7.4 In the role of logosemantic subject: a cosmic order
Having arrived at this particular point in the course of my argument, I should 
perhaps digress a bit on what my own choice for a logosemantic subject would 
be, the subject to which I would have to bring a conceptual balance between 
simplicity and complexity. This subject would not be “nature” or “the universe” 
(nor “knowledge”, or “power”, or some such candidate), but rather the idea of an 
order holding fo r  the universe. My assumption is that the universe, while 
reflecting this order at every moment of its existence, and in everyone one of its 
interwoven structures (cf. my side-remark in section 7.1 above), cannot itself be 
the origin of the latter. The universe rather presupposes such an order. However, I 
do feel inclined toward a “holistic” conception of this order, in assuming it to be 
one overarching reality in which not only the laws of nature but also certain 
(given) social, moral, spiritual and other principles are unified, while all these 
complexly interconnected laws and principles operate on distinct and irreducible 
levels within this unity. Which unity can be thought of as the one, ruling and 
redeeming, “text” for reality -  a conception that would, I suppose, have more in 
common with ancient Jewish understandings of the power of a preceding logos 
over reality, than with Eastern naturalist philosophies. O f course, someone like 
Chomsky also holds that the social, moral, political, and other aspects of human 
behaviour are ruled in some sense by preceding principles; only he locates the 
source of these principles in the human mind (cf. Haley & Lunsford, 1994:182­
186).
The anti-reductionist “flavour” of this conception of a preceding cosmic order is 
apparent in the way that it allows us to analyse fundamental phenomena of our 
experiential world, like justice or art, with reference to corresponding principles 
that hold for them within the cosmic order of things; rather than simply reducing 
them to other phenomena such as historical change or psychological mechanisms. 
(Although the latter will of course be in some way connected to the former 
phenomena.)
Though I assume the order of natural laws and normative principles that I am 
talking about to have some kind of reality outside the human mind, I do think that 
this order is reflected within the structure of the latter. For this reason we can
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say, as Chomsky would push us to say, that the principles of for example logo­
semantics are to be found within the mind (specifically that faculty of mind that 
allows for the construction of “theories” of reality), but with this qualification, 
that these cognitive principles only reflect a pre-existing “script” of principles 
“written” for the operations of the mind.
After this digression regarding a possible alternative to the logosemantic concept 
of a systems-theoretical universe, I will now return to the main route of my 
analysis and move on to the next and final subsection.
7.5 The paradigmatic “colouring” of complexity: systems theory
As stated earlier, logosemantic propositions nearly always function within a 
interpretative framework of some sort: some kind of tradition, or worldview, or 
school of thought. In the present context, let us call this framework a theoretical 
paradigm -  which paradigm provides the immediate conceptual context within 
which a proposition is advanced. (In section 2 above, I distinguished between 
paradigmatic types and paradigmatic time-frames.) The central proposition that 
houses Capra’s notion of complexity is also contextualised in such a paradigm -  
which itself consists of some interconnected sub-paradigms (see the Introduction 
and section 2.2 above). One of these sub-paradigms goes under the name of 
systems theory. And when it comes to the systems understanding of complexity, 
there are some conceptual problems to be faced.
These problems have to do with the way that (the theory of) systemic complexity 
handles difference. The problems with difference that I will deal with here, occur 
in the social sphere, in two contexts: the context of social institutions and their 
inter-relations, and the context of phenomena of dissent in society. Let me briefly 
identify the problem of difference on these two levels.
With regard to social institutions, my own feeling is that, in the interests of 
freedom, the complex diversity of these institutions should be acknowledged, 
without our seeking to impose some kind of inclusive societal whole on this 
diversity. Any such effort, whether conceptual or organisational, may result in 
relativising the internal freedom and autonomy of institutions. For instance, we all 
know that though they exist within the territorial boundaries of the state, the 
nature of the family or the university is such that they cannot in any way be 
viewed as parts -  even largely autonomous parts -  of the juridical-administrative 
structure of the state. Now the problem with the systems view of institutional 
complexity seems to be that one does in fact end up with some kind of over­
arching societal whole in which this complexity comes to be organised as the 
parts (subsystems) of a unifying whole. To me, this implies that institutional
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differences can then only concern the “particulars” of parts that are otherwise 
qualitatively equal because they belong to the same system.30 But are there really 
only differences of degree between say family life, the world of business, and the 
university establishment -  or are there rather fundamental, qualitative differences? 
Is the distinctive knowledge concern of the university really to be viewed as 
ultimately subordinate to the higher law of the larger system that embraces it? In 
this regard, I also refer to a perceptive remark by Thomas McCarthy (1991:178) 
to the effect that whereas social systems theory tends to focus on the environ­
ments of systems, it is not necessarily useful in reconstructing the inner dynamics 
of a system such as the state for example. Consider, finally, the political 
implications attaching to the ideal of a (scientifically devised) systemic blueprint 
o f society: the allure of a more effective political control over societal complexity, 
in the name of a great encompassing whole to which all must bow (cf. Schuur- 
man, 1985:23-29). The question may indeed arise whether this “treatment” of 
complexity is not essentially reductionist in character -  reducing real (and whole­
some) difference to a decreed unity.
With regard to the matter of social dissent, the problem with the systems 
approach is the following. A property of natural systems seems to be that they 
either maintain themselves through and in spite of change (and far more con­
servatively than one would predict from knowing only about the changing sub­
systems), or eventually totally transform themselves in the path of evolutionary 
change (cf. Capra, 1985:292, 311). If this is more or less the model for social 
systems, how can we account for fundamental dissent from  the system arising 
within the system (in revolutionary politics, radical social movements and so on)?
I am talking here of dissent which experiences itself as something quite apart 
from the integrating system, and not as some mechanism within the system, by 
which the latter in fact succeeds in dynamically conserving itself. Or are the 
actions of the radical social movements in fact only part of a naturally self­
regulating societal system? Again, this seems at odds with the basic intuitions of 
freedom and normative responsibility upon which a “counter-cultural” politics 
bases itself (and to which Capra himself subscribes).31 Viewing the difference 
that radical protest makes as part o f our cultural complexity is one thing; viewing 
it as part of the complex behaviour of an encompassing and integrating system is 
quite another
The issue of systemic complexity versus freedom and dissent can also be 
approached from another angle. It is well-known that besides the sphere of social
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action, Capra’s flunking is also directed to the sphere of personal transformation 
(spiritual growth). In fact, both these worlds come together with that of scientific 
knowledge in his program for a holistic philosophy. It, however, seems to me that 
specifically the systems-theoretic understanding of complexly-interlocking wholes 
is, as such, in fundamental tension with the ideal of personal transformation in 
its fullest sense. The former starts from, or works toward, an allegedly “pure” 
scientific analysis of the all-embracing natural horizon within which both ma­
terial phenomena and normative behaviour are objectively controlled by complex 
systems on various levels. The latter starts from the goal of personal freedom  that 
is to be attained by various practices of self-care, aimed at subjectively transcen­
ding the “givenness” of the world around us. Instead of attending to the scien­
tifically disclosed complexity by which subjectivity is ruled and the technological 
means by which this complexity might be managed, the transformation ideal 
rather searches for a serene simplicity inside and outside of us, through which 
liberated subjectivity may rise above the constraints of the objective world.
The nearest that the systems-approach can probably come to this latter ideal, is by 
contemplating, from an administrative-managerial perspective on organisational 
complexity, the desirability of something like a world religion -  in which diverse 
elements from contemporary religions are actually combined (thus Laszlo [1994], 
quoted in Schuurman, 1985:26, 92) This seems to me quite far removed from, 
and even opposed to, the radical kind of spirituality endorsed by Capra and others 
(and for which I have a degree of sympathy, even though I regard the goals of this 
spirituality as somewhat unrealistic). Though I am aware of the fact that Capra 
seeks to combine the two different ideals I have sketched above (for example by 
moving from the nature concept of the systems theorist to that of the mystic), my 
impression is that their “inner logics” are in fact quite incompatible -  at most one 
can try and externally harmonise them by in some way interfering with the inner 
logic of either the one or the other. This is of course not to say that scientific 
complexity cannot be harmonised with spiritual simplicity: the problem is rather 
how science and spirituality as such are perceived within some or other con­
ceptual framework.
In this context, it must also be remarked that the central tension between the 
natural-scientific and the normative-emancipatory modes of thought that seems to 
be the ultimate issue here, cannot be resolved by combining, or replacing, a 
mechanistic model with an organistic one that appears applicable to both the 
material and the spiritual worlds (cf. Capra, 1983:336 for example). The reason 
for this is that both of these models in the end lead us only to a pre-normative 
frame o f  reference, and the organistic model in its modem cybernetic sense 
cannot but favour the naturalist-scientific stance (cf. McCarthy, 1991:175-176). It 
seems doubtful whether simplicity and complexity in the spiritual, social and 
cultural worlds can really be understood by abstracting away from the normative
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content of these worlds in what amounts to naturalistic reductionism. To me it 
even seems a bit ironical that a (propositional) recognition of complexity can be 
joined to theoretical perspectives that in fact seem to deny that there might be a 
multi-layered complexity to reality that is not reducible to some or other natural 
substratum.
8. Conclusion
Having subjected the basic design of Capra’s holism to a logosemantic analysis, 
we have come to understand this approach in terms of the conceptual rules of 
philosophical conceptualisation. It is in the context of these rules that the idea of 
the universe as a unified whole has come to stand in a new light. But it is the 
accompanying idea of systemic complexity that was the main focus of our 
investigation, and at least the basic outlines of the logosemantic story of com­
plexity have emerged. We have seen how different rhetorical effects can be 
accomplished with this attribute, in the language of holism, but also in other 
philosophical languages. Along the way, new perspectives have been gained on 
the tensive relations between Capra’s scientific holism and mainstream physics, 
esthetic postmodernism, spiritual transformationalism, the social movement cul­
ture, and aspects of Eastern philosophy.
In my opinion there is more work waiting to be done on the concept of com­
plexity (and on all o f the other philosophical attributes), within the analytical 
framework sketched in this article. To my mind the latter offers something of a 
new path for philosophical reflection, one which promises rewards in terms of 
intellectually challenging work and deep-delving reconstructive theories. And 
though such a reconstructionist perspective seems to have more in common with 
postmetaphysical formal-descriptive approaches to cognition than with the tra­
ditional philosophical search for (and defense of) substantive origins and founda­
tions, it can nevertheless pack a telling critical punch. For we found Capra’s 
holism to contain a certain conceptual imbalance between complexity and 
simplicity -  at odds with his insistence on a kind of complementarity between 
other system properties of the same sort. We also found that systemic complexity 
has some problems in recognising and honouring certain kinds of difference -  
among them the kind that radical social movements have come to signify.
In closing, let me make one more remark on Capra’s holism, with reference to the 
concept of complexity. The theoretical complexity of this approach itself is 
located on different levels: from the subtle root-dialectic between nature and 
freedom, to the creative synthesis o f widely diverging worldviews (ranging from 
mystical Eastern doctrines to nuclear physics to social movement politics), to a 
spectrum of theoretical positions that entail a certain anti-reductionism and a 
certain anti-scientism (1983:16; 1985:42, 89), in combination with a qualified 
defense of scientific rationality, an accomplished emancipatory critique of culture
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and society, and an endorsement of progressive spiritual ideals. Thus this model 
has obvious advantages over others of a different type, regarding the real com­
plexity we face when engaging in serious intellectual reflection on the world 
around us. Yet the question is whether one of the basic components of this en­
compassing synthesis, namely the systems-theoretical understanding of com­
plexity, does not tend to bring with it its own brand of (what might be called) 
reductionism and scientism, which ultimately must work against some of the other 
components of the model.
In light-hearted vein, I end with some thoughts in home-made verse, that sort of 
summarise the findings of this article on another level -  a technique I borrow 
from the published proceedings of a landmark symposium on complexity (Aida et 
al., 1985).
How strange for us to contemplate 
thoughts with which the world we confiscate 
our thinking on the great simplicity 
our vision of the ultimate complexity 
so caught up in the rules of the game 
the mind’s freedom so put to shame
But while the mould that to our thoughts brings nurture 
is so utterly cast in the iron of human nature 
their bright colours remain a free creation 
gloriously open to our bold innovation
Let us then celebrate
and in our discourses narrate
the Many in conjunction with Singularity
Seamless Unity in systeinless Complexity
Postscript
Some weeks after the conference at which the initial paper was read, Capra’s 
book The Web o f  Life (1996) was published. A few remarks about this work are 
in order. Firstly, the book is a continuation of Capra’s holistic philosophy: it is 
meant to expand on certain themes discussed in The Turning Point. Therefore the 
analysis presented above is still very much to the point. Secondly, the new book 
contains a chapter entitled “The Mathematics of Complexity” -  which is of 
obvious importance for the theme of our investigation. However, everything that 
Capra says in this chapter (and elsewhere in the book) regarding the notion of 
complexity, seems to presuppose the conceptual framework sketched out above. 
Of special interest is the fact that he now refers explicitly not only to complexity 
theory, but also to (its offshoot) chaos theory. His treatment of these theories, 
however, only seems to underline the basic tension thematised in subsection 6.5.2 
above: the fight for supremacy between complexity and simplicity. The inherent 
logic of holism and systems theory points to an ever-preceding complexity; chaos
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theory, for its part, assumes a sovereign simplicity at the root of the latter. Capra 
still seems to be unaware of this deep rift, a conceptual polarisation of the kind 
that postmodern deconstuctors like to get their teeth into.
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